

AUMUNS

STUDY GUIDE

**UNDER
SECRETARY
GENERAL:
DORUK SAPMAZ
& KUZZEY
KARLIK**

**ACADEMIC
ASSISTANT:
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UNOQA

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Letter from Secretary General:

Letter from Secretary-General

Honourable participants,

First order of business, I would like to welcome you all with open arms and utmost gratitude for attending our conference. I truly hope you can find a little solace and comfort with your peers here, as our conference and team truly care about you and we will be trying our best to accommodate you.

I would also like to remind you that we intend to keep everyone involved in a place of safety, and comfort. As we all witnessed the last events in our country, I can promise that those who act out of order will be taken care of and thrown out of the conference immediately.

As the Secretary-General, I offer you a variety of global problems to work on and create solutions accordingly, as it is what boils down to with every Model United Nations conference around the globe. I truly hope this will be a place where you can learn and grow both intellectually and personally. You are in a place where you will be heard, valued, and supported.

What I offered is only possible with an academic team like this, so those who I have in my team should know that I offered their positions accordingly, and knowingly. I expected the best, which they gave in return. I am truly grateful for everyone in my team, and I know for a fact that also our delegates will feel the same way I do.

Those who will be attending a conference for the first time, I hope our conference will get you hooked on MUN conferences and make you expand your horizon as much as you can in order to become a better version of yourselves in every possible area that we can offer. Attending a conference where everyone is your peer might be a little overwhelming but rest assured, me and my academic team, will be here to ensure your careers as MUNers will begin smoothly, and in any occasion that might make you uncomfortable in or outside of our formal sessions, I truly have the greatest organization team that ever existed, so you can rely on them as much as you can rely on me.

I also would like to extend my special thanks to my executive team, Ekin Su Öztürk and Emir Güneş, who gave their incredible efforts to ensure our organization team is spotless, in and out of our conference. Also, Mert Sürücü, for sticking with me throughout this almost five year old journey of MUNing, with an unbelievable amount of ups and downs, and yet we are still here.

I truly can not wait to see you all in AUMUN'26.

Truly yours,
Bedirhan CURA
Secretary General

Letter from Under-Secretaries Generals:

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you all to the United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs! I am Kuzey Karlık and it is my utmost pleasure to serve you as the under secretary general of this committee.

First, I would like to thank the executive team for granting me this opportunity in this marvelous conference. Then I would like to thank my co- Under Secretary General Doruk because of his utmost determination and him being an amazing person overall. And I would like to thank our academic assistant Yankı whose effort is undeniable, especially his determination in the study guide.

The study guide we wrote contains crucial information for this committee. Yet as its name states it's only a guide for you, so I am highly encouraging you to do your research properly, there will be a lot of debate points, disagreements and controversies hence you have to be ready.

I am sure this committee will be a blast, and I am looking forward to meeting you all on 1-3 May. If you have any questions you can always contact me through mail.

Sincerely,

Kuzey, Under Secretary General of UNODA,

kuzeykarlik@gmail.com

Letter from Under-Secretaries Generals:

Hello everybody, My name is Doruk Sapmaz,

I graduated from Antalya High School this year and am currently studying so as to study at the University of Akdeniz. My thanks goes to my big brother and my role model, the best Secretary General Bedirhan Cura for believing in me and the rest of the executive team for their hardworks and efforts. I strongly advise you to read the guide that I,my other Under-Secretary General and my brother Kuzey Karlık and our hardworking academic assistant Ata Yankı Kılınç, who has written most of the guide, have written.

I wish you all a great conference and can't wait to meet you all in person!

If you have any questions please contact me at any given time.

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Letter from the Academic Assistant:

Dear Delegates, Respected Academic Team, and Fellow Participants,

I extend a warm welcome to all of you as the Academic Assistant of the UNODA committee to the AUMUN'26. My name is Ata Yankı KILINÇ and I am a student at Antalya Anatolian High School. Firstly, I would like to thank the Secretariat and my Co-Under-Secretary Generals Kuzey Karlık and Doruk Sapmaz for inviting me to this conference as an academic assistant of the United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs committee.

Then I would like to continue my letter to mention that our agenda item is quite critical for all of us and the history of the world which is Renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT). I would like to italicize that every representative shall read and do some research afterwards. One of the most important parts of our study guide is the “What We Expect From You?”. For understanding your tasks for the committee this part is really essential. I would also like to mention, I believe if you read this guide carefully, you will be present and attentive in the committee, If you have any questions please feel free to ask anytime via my phone number or gmail address from,

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Ata Yankı KILINÇ Academic Assistant

Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was set up in January 1998. At that time it was called the Department for Disarmament Affairs. This was part of the Secretary General's plan to reform. The plan was based on his report to the General Assembly (A/51/950).

The ODA has its roots in 1982. It was created because of a suggestion from the General Assembly's special meeting on disarmament (SSOD II). In 1992 its name was changed to Centre for Disarmament Affairs. This was under the Department of Political Affairs. At the end of 1997 it was renamed Department for Disarmament Affairs. In 2007 it became the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Office for Disarmament Affairs helps with efforts to disarm. The goal is complete disarmament. This has to be under effective international control. The programme's mandate comes from General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions focus on disarmament.

Weapons of destruction are a big concern. Nuclear weapons are especially worrying. They are very destructive and threaten humanity. The Office also looks at the impact of major conventional weapons. Emerging weapon technologies, like weapons, are also a focus.

UNODA helps with efforts. It supports the General Assembly and its First Committee. It also works with the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Office provides information on issues. This information is for Member States, multilateral agreement parties and the public.

UNODA also supports disarmament measures. These measures are taken after a conflict. They include disarming and demobilizing combatants. They also help former combatants reintegrate into society.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs supports efforts. These efforts aim to achieve complete disarmament. The Office works to address impacts. It provides information and support for measures.

UNODA fosters disarmament measures. It encourages dialogue and transparency on matters. The Office promotes disarmament efforts. These efforts include the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The Office provides support for norm-setting. It works with the General Assembly and other bodies. UNODA helps with efforts. It provides information and support for disarmament measures.

Introduction to the Agenda Item

Our Agenda Item is Renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) which is one of the most important and is a topic that has been and continues to be relevant today and in recent history. Currently the world is militarily escalating, especially the MENA region. In 1970 in order to prevent the usage of nuclear weaponry in escalations the United Nations established and made the NPT agreement get sealed.

The Nuclear Weapons Treaty, also known as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an important agreement between countries. This agreement is meant to stop weapons from spreading to help countries use nuclear energy in a peaceful way and to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was established in 1970. It is the basis of the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Things have changed a lot since then. Countries are updating their weapons and some people are worried that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not being enforced fairly. There is also a gap between countries that have nuclear weapons and those that do not. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is working to fix these problems.

So when we talk about renewing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons we are talking about making it stronger and more fair for all countries. We want to make sure the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can still stop the spread of weapons and keep the world safe. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is very important, for security.

Introduction to the Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a deal. It is an agreement between countries to stop the spread of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons technology. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also helps countries work together to use Nuclear Energy in a way.. It tries to get rid of Nuclear Weapons altogether. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the agreement that says countries with Nuclear Weapons have to get rid of them.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for people to sign in 1968. It started being used in 1970. On 11 May 1995 people decided that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would never end. Now 191 countries are part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This includes the five countries that are known to have Weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is very important. It helps stop the spread of Nuclear Weapons. It also helps countries work together to get rid of Nuclear Weapons and all other kinds of weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has three goals. First it tries to stop the spread of Nuclear Weapons. Second, it tries to get countries to work together to get rid of Nuclear Weapons and all other kinds of weapons. Third, it helps countries work together to use Nuclear Energy in a way.

To make sure countries are following the rules, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons set up a system to check on them. This system is run by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic Energy Agency checks on countries to make sure they are not making weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also helps countries work together to use Nuclear Energy in a way. It makes sure that all countries have access to this technology.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons says that every five years countries have to review how well the Treaty is working. This review is very important. It helps countries see how well they are doing and what they need to work on. The last few reviews have been difficult. In 2010 countries were able to agree on some things.. In 2015 they were not able to agree on anything. This is a problem because the review is supposed to help countries work together to stop the spread of Nuclear Weapons, get rid of Nuclear Weapons and use Nuclear Energy in a way.

The next review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is going to happen in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026. A time ago on 11 May 1995 countries decided that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would never end.

Historical Background

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The NPT agreement was established after the acceleration of nuclear arms development and its transformation into an arms race, and its active use in World War II for the purpose of mass destruction. One of the Key Historical Developments related to nuclear non-proliferation was the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. The crisis started with the secret deployment of nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba, which was located only 90 miles from the territory of the United States. When the United States discovered the missile installations through aerial supervision, it imposed a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent further Soviet military shipments.

The Blockade continued for 13 days. During these thirteen days in October 1962, the world came extremely close to a nuclear war between the two superpowers. The crisis was eventually resolved through diplomatic negotiations, where the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba, while the United States secretly agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the enormous risk of nuclear escalation and highlighted the urgent need for arms control mechanisms. As a result, it encouraged both superpowers to pursue diplomatic agreements to reduce nuclear tensions and prevent accidental nuclear conflict. The lessons learned from this crisis significantly influenced the creation of later nuclear arms control agreements, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty and eventually the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

Following the escalations caused by nuclear weaponry deployed by the Soviet Union with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the international community looked for ways to limit the development and testing of nuclear weapons. One of the first major agreements addressing this issue was the Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

The treaty prohibited nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, while still allowing underground testing. The main objective of the agreement was to reduce radioactive fallout caused by atmospheric nuclear explosions in nuclear weaponry experiments and to slow down the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. Although the treaty did not completely stop nuclear weapons testing, it represented an important first step towards international nuclear arms control and against Withdrawal from Nuclear weapons. The Partial Test Ban Treaty also helped establish the diplomatic framework that later enabled the negotiation of the NPT in 1968. By limiting the environments in which nuclear weapons could be tested, the treaty demonstrated that international cooperation could successfully reduce some of the dangers associated with nuclear weapons development.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

The Cold War was a scary time. The United States and the Soviet Union had a lot of warheads. They had tens of thousands of them. This was very dangerous. So they decided to talk to each other and try to reduce the number of warheads. They wanted to make sure they did not have a conflict.

They made some agreements to reduce the number of warheads. One of these agreements was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. They signed this treaty in 1991. The treaty said that the United States and the Soviet Union could not have many nuclear warheads. They had to get rid of some of them. The treaty also said that they had to let each other check to make sure they were not cheating.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was very important. It helped reduce the number of warheads in the world. It showed that countries could work together to get rid of weapons. This was a goal for many people.

Later the United States and Russia made another agreement. This was the New START Treaty. They signed it in 2010. The treaty said that the United States and Russia could not have many nuclear warheads. They could only have 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads. The treaty also said that they could not have many intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

The New START Treaty was also very important. It helped increase trust between the United States and Russia. They had to tell each other what they were doing. They had to let each other check to make sure they were not cheating.

There is another treaty that's very important. This is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The United Nations adopted this treaty in 2017. The treaty says that nuclear weapons are not allowed. Countries cannot make them test them or use them.

This treaty is very good. It helps keep people safe.. Some countries do not agree with it. The United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom do not support it. They think it is not an idea.. Other people think it is a great idea. They think it will help get rid of weapons forever.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a deal. It shows that many countries want to get rid of weapons. They want to make the world a safer place. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is also very important. It helps reduce the number of warheads in the world. The New START Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are both part of this goal. They are both trying to make the world a safer place.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the New START Treaty are all connected. They are all trying to reduce the number of warheads in the world. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is also connected to these treaties. It is trying to get rid of weapons forever. All of these treaties are important. They are all trying to make the world a safer place. The United States and Russia and other countries must work together to make sure these treaties are successful. They must work together to get rid of weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the New START Treaty are all steps, towards a safer world.

During the Cold War, the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, possessed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. In order to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and fulfill the disarmament commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both countries began negotiating major arms reduction agreements.

One of the most important of these agreements was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed in 1991. The treaty placed strict limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems possessed by both states. It required each country to significantly reduce its nuclear arsenal and introduced detailed verification mechanisms, including on-site inspections and information exchanges.

START played a major role in reducing the nuclear arsenals of the world's largest nuclear powers after the Cold War. It also demonstrated that bilateral arms control agreements could contribute to the broader global goals of nuclear disarmament outlined in the NPT framework.

New START Treaty (2010)

Continuing the arms reduction process initiated by earlier agreements, the New START was signed in 2010 between the United States and Russia. The treaty limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and placed restrictions on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

In addition to these limits, New START introduced a comprehensive verification system that includes on-site inspections, regular data exchanges, and notification mechanisms. These measures increase transparency and trust between the two largest nuclear powers.

The treaty represents one of the most important modern efforts to fulfill the nuclear disarmament commitments of the NPT. However, debates about its future and renewal have raised concerns about the long-term stability of nuclear arms control between major powers.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017)

A more recent development in global nuclear governance is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by the United Nations in 2017. The treaty represents the first legally binding international agreement that comprehensively prohibits nuclear weapons.

The agreement bans the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also includes provisions related to assistance for victims of nuclear weapons use and environmental remediation in affected areas.

However, the treaty has been controversial because none of the major nuclear-armed states—including the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—have joined it. Critics argue that without the participation of nuclear-armed states, the treaty may have limited practical impact. Supporters, on the other hand, believe that it strengthens the global norm against nuclear weapons and complements the objectives of the NPT by promoting complete nuclear disarmament.

Current Geopolitical Tensions

Iran Nuclear Programme

Although Iran is an NPT member, they have been accused of developing nuclear weapons capability under civilian cover. Iran's nuclear ambitions have been a focus of international diplomacy for decades. Faced with accusations of nuclear weapons pursuits in violation of its NPT commitments, Iran concluded a 2015 agreement, the JCPOA, to restrict its nuclear program. However, the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the deal and subsequent Iranian violations cast doubt on the deal's future. In June 2025, Israel conducted extensive air attacks against Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities. The United States also conducted air and missile strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. Iran retaliated by firing approximately 530 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones against Israel, and also firing 14 missiles against the U.S. Al Udeid airbase in Qatar. With JCPOA, Iran has enriched their nuclear weaponry with a rate up to 60%.

Russia-Ukraine War & Nuclear Threats

The war between Russia and Ukraine is making people around the world worried about safety and if countries will keep their promises to reduce nuclear weapons. Russia, which has weapons, has been talking about using them and has put its military on high alert, which is scary. Ukraine used to have weapons but gave them up in 1994. They did this because they were promised that they would be left alone and their borders would be respected. However Russia still attacked Ukraine. This is a problem because it shows that giving up nuclear weapons does not keep a country safe. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is about countries not having weapons. If countries think that giving up weapons does not make them safer they might want to keep them. Some countries might think that having weapons is the best way to stay safe in a world where you cannot always trust other countries. The situation with Russia and Ukraine is making people question if giving up weapons is a good idea. The war between Russia and Ukraine is a test for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If countries with weapons do not keep their promises other countries might want to get nuclear weapons too. This could make the world a dangerous place. Russia's actions are making people wonder if the current system is working. Nuclear safety and disarmament are concerns. The world is watching to see what happens next.

Weak Mechanisms and Penalization

The main reasons of the urgent necessity of renewal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are the inequality between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear States, Lack of Enforcements in Withdrawal from Nuclear Weaponry, the Problem of Withdrawal Clause (Article X), Peaceful Use Dual-Use Problem. The current situation in the world especially in the MENA region which is escalated militarily

Although precautions against the production of nuclear weapons such as nuclear energy usage supervision by IAEA, nuclear state definition which created inequalities, Withdrawal from Nuclear Weaponry Government Enforcements entered into force with the agreement, the prescription given by the UN and the world wasn't efficiently enough for complete Withdrawal from Nuclear weapons.

In the NPT agreement there is no penalization which is related to budget, commerce or other such economical assets but after the International Atomic Energy Agency's supervision if there are some illicit usage of nuclear energy detected penalization such Reporting to the UN Security Council, UN Sanctions such as Economic sanctions, Arms embargoes, Diplomatic pressure. In extreme cases, authorization of stronger measures may be imposed by the Security Council. Also Countries violating the treaty may face Diplomatic isolation, Trade restrictions, Suspension of nuclear cooperation which are not definitive and legalized. For example Iran faced sanctions after disputes over its nuclear program and for further more example, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and later faced heavy UN sanctions after nuclear tests.

Inequality Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear States and the Necessity of Universification

The treaty formally recognizes only five nuclear-weapon states which are the United States of America, China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and France. Other nuclear-armed states which are outside the treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel and lastly North Korea who withdrew in 2003 (The Problem of Withdrawal Clause). These states and the citizens who are living in a close region with these other nuclear-armed states who are not currently in the Treaty creates a dangerous region. This danger zone creates an unstabilized region with high-possible militaric escalation and political fractions which may lead to peace to vanish and war.

This inequality can also create a perception of a “two-tier system”, where some states legally possess nuclear weapons while others are permanently restricted. The universalization and prevention of the loopholes in the treaty has to be prevented or the world may be dragged to a World War which countries with more deadly weapons of mass destruction would demolish and attack not only the countries and to the humanity which is built in most regions of our world.

In the NPT agreement the member states are divided into two main groups: Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. According to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons defines a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) as a country that tested a nuclear device before 1 January 1967. The main reasons why the NPT agreement shall be renewed and delegates debate are that the nuclear weapon states are defined with a time not based on moral or security. This status of the states which have tried and had the nuclear weaponry before 1st of January 1967 creates an inequality which may lead to a permanent nuclear privilege. This status allows a legal maintenance of the nuclear weaponry and creates a threat to the countries close. It also effectively maintains and stays with the Cold War power structures and doesn't allow any more country to change it.

Reconsideration of the Nuclear-Weapon States Definition

The aforementioned problem that occurred with the definition of nuclear-weapon states is one of the main topics that shall be renewed in the NPT agreement. The Nuclear-Weapon States definition creates an inequality in nuclear weapon maintaining rights. With the status of a nuclear-weapon state which guaranteed with the establishment of NPT agreement allowed the Cold War power structure to remain and P5 countries to be more powerful with nuclear weaponry. The definition institutionalized the Cold War nuclear hierarchy. Although this definition caused some remain in power structure in the world this first definition established a stabilized world for 56 years. With the assistance of the definition Stability and Predictability established in the world. This definition has prevented widespread nuclear proliferation since 1970. Unfortunately this deficient definition caused some inequalities such as Only 5 officially recognized NWS reduces the number of actors with legal nuclear status.

This definition for the nuclear-weapon state has created a legal gap for the countries who achieved the nuclear-weapon state status. Although this has created a legal superiority of power to the nuclear-weapon states, the risk of widespread nuclear proliferation has been reduced and really decreased the menace that may be caused by nuclear weaponry. The definition is historically grounded (pre-1967 test criterion). Clear distinction between Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS).

Another advantage that is provided with the establishment of the definition is the increased prevention movements against nuclear armament. The foundation of the Non-Proliferation Regime was established with the NPT agreement. This regime between the states, not only the nuclear-weapon states, has created the nuclear governance. With these series of consecutive events The NPT is often called the cornerstone of global nuclear governance. Also with this nuclear governance this treaty with this definition encourages non-proliferation norms. Many countries chose not to pursue nuclear weapons partly thanks to the NPT framework. It also reinforces the global norm against new nuclear states.

Despite these advantages ensured with the establishment of the definitions and segregation the main support for the renewal of the definition was caused by Structural Inequality, Disarmament Gap, Exclusion of De Facto Nuclear States and Withdrawal Clause Problems. Aforementioned structural inequalities which legally legitimized five nuclear powers while permanently prohibiting others. This created a segregation between countries and would cause an inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states in a possible war.

Lack of Enforcement in Withdrawal from Nuclear Weaponry

The current systems, especially the enforcement of establishing withdrawals from the nuclear weaponry, are established but weak and do not accomplish the goals determined in the agreement. This disaccomplishment situation has occurred again because of the inequality that occurred after the definition of the nuclear-weapon states. The renewed agreement lacks both the aforementioned necessity in re-determining the nuclear weapon states or changing the country of influence and the lack of enforcement in withdrawal from nuclear weaponry.

The world is aware of the necessity to encourage governments to withdraw from nuclear weaponry. At the time that the NPT agreement was sealed and dealt with by the representatives, the world was also aware of this necessity, and it was one of the main goals that must be achieved. The NPT agreement encouraged and created enforcement for the governments to accomplish. They were:

1. Non-proliferation
2. Disarmament
3. Peaceful use of nuclear energy

1. Non-Proliferation (Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons imposed the following measures on states on prohibition on the non-nuclear armed states which is also called with the definition the nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear weaponry, transfer and commerce on technology related to nuclear weapons, Civilian nuclear programs which shall subject to international oversight by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a safeguards system was created to prevent the military use of nuclear material. The main assistance for supervision ensured by IAEA is on nuclear facilities, uranium enrichment activities and nuclear materials that have the possibility to be used in militarism goals.

In order to ensure non-proliferation, the IAEA conducts inspections and supervision over governments and national science labs to ensure compliance. These inspections can include annual or more frequent checks, especially in sensitive facilities.

If the inspections and supervisions detect some illicit experiments over the nuclear weaponry, the country is reported to the United Nations Security Council as aforementioned.

In this topic the representatives must also focus on dual-use technology. Dual-use technology which is civilian nuclear technology that can also be used militarily poses supervision challenges. The representatives shall also give solutions on the ways to detect dual-use technology and supervise the reasons and goals widely and deeply.

Dual-use technology refers to equipment, materials, or knowledge that can serve both peaceful civilian purposes and military/weapons purposes. In the nuclear context, this is the critical vulnerability that makes enforcing the NPT so challenging. The same centrifuges that enrich uranium for reactor fuel can enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. The same reprocessing plants that extract usable fuel from spent nuclear reactor materials can extract plutonium for nuclear weapons.

The fundamental paradox of the NPT is this: Article IV grants all states the "inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But there is no technical difference between the machinery and processes used for civilian energy and those used for weapons development. A country can be 100% compliant with the NPT while simultaneously building the infrastructure needed to produce nuclear weapons within months.

Examples for Better Understanding :

- **Iran:** Iran's uranium enrichment program operates under civilian cover, claiming it needs enriched uranium for reactor fuel and medical isotopes. However, enriching uranium to 60% purity (as reported in 2025) far exceeds what is needed for civilian nuclear reactors (which require only 3-5% enrichment). This creates the suspicion—never definitively proven—that Iran is advancing toward weapons-grade enrichment capability.
- **North Korea:** Before withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, North Korea operated civilian nuclear research facilities while secretly developing weapons-grade plutonium production. By the time it withdrew, it had already created the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
- **Iraq (pre-1991):** Iraq's nuclear program was disguised as a civilian research initiative, but UN inspectors later discovered extensive weapons development activities hidden within the civilian infrastructure.

Categories of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology:

- **Uranium Enrichment Technology:** Centrifuges that separate uranium isotopes. Essential for both reactor fuel and weapons. Very difficult to monitor because the equipment itself looks the same regardless of intended purpose.
- **Reprocessing Plants:** Industrial facilities that extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Civilian use is legitimate (some countries recycle fuel), but the same facility can produce weapons-grade plutonium.
- **Heavy Water Production:** Used in certain reactor designs and also as a moderator in weapons research. Countries claiming to need it for civilian purposes may actually be developing weapons capability.
- **Precision Manufacturing Equipment:** High-tech machinery (like specialized computer numerical control machines) can shape nuclear weapons components. Classified as "dual-use" under export control regimes.

- **Advanced Materials:** Specialized alloys, ceramics, and composites used in reactor construction can also be used in weapon designs. Same materials, different applications.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is supposed to verify that dual-use facilities remain civilian. However declared-undeclared activities, conversion speed and technical ambiguities create obstacles in this aim.

- **Declared vs. Undeclared Activities:** The IAEA can only inspect facilities that states declare. If a country secretly builds an undeclared enrichment plant (as Iran did at Fordow for years), it may escape detection until intelligence agencies discover it.
- **Conversion Speed:** Even with constant monitoring, a state can technically convert a civilian facility to weapons production in a matter of months or weeks. The IAEA's inspections are periodic, not continuous.
- **Technical Ambiguity:** There is no physical test that definitively proves whether a facility will produce civilian or weapons-grade material. Everything depends on operational choices (enrichment levels, processing rates) that can be changed quickly.

2. Disarmament (Nuclear Disarmament)

In the treaty one of the most important and urgent topics was named nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT regulates this matter. In the agreement it was clearly stated that negotiating for the reduction of nuclear weapons, decelerating and preventing the armament race. The goal is general and complete disarmament. In line with this objective, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the New START were sealed. These agreements were specifically aimed at reducing the number of strategic nuclear warheads possessed by the United States and Russia.

One of the most important and urgent objectives of the Treaty is nuclear disarmament. This issue is addressed in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under this article, all parties to the Treaty commit to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. The article emphasizes that nuclear-weapon states carry a particular responsibility in leading these efforts, since they possess the majority of the world's nuclear weapons. The ultimate objective outlined in the Treaty is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, meaning a global security environment in which nuclear weapons are significantly reduced and eventually eliminated under strict international control.

The concept of nuclear disarmament within the Treaty framework is closely linked to the prevention of further escalation in nuclear weapon development. During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between major powers led to the production of thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Article VI therefore encourages diplomatic negotiations and international agreements that would gradually limit and reduce nuclear arsenals. These efforts aim not only to decrease the total number of nuclear weapons but also to increase strategic stability, reduce the risk of accidental nuclear conflict, and strengthen global security. By promoting arms control agreements and confidence-building measures, the Treaty attempts to create a long-term pathway toward a safer international system.

In line with these objectives, several bilateral arms control agreements were concluded between the world's largest nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Russia. One of the most significant of these agreements is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in 1991. START established legally binding limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. The treaty also introduced extensive verification mechanisms, such as on-site inspections and data exchanges, which helped ensure transparency and trust between the two countries while significantly reducing their nuclear arsenals.

A later agreement, the New START treaty signed in 2010, further strengthened these disarmament efforts by setting additional limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems possessed by the United States and Russia. The treaty capped the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 for each country and limited the number of deployed launch systems. Similar to the original START treaty, New START included verification procedures such as inspections, notifications, and monitoring systems that allow both parties to confirm compliance with the agreement. These treaties represent some of the most significant practical steps taken toward fulfilling the disarmament obligations outlined in Article VI of the NPT, demonstrating how bilateral agreements between major nuclear powers can contribute to the broader goal of reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Although the ideas seem to be shared, mostly the p5 countries which are the most nuclear-weapon-containing-countries are not in the same opinion as the other countries. Article VI states that "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Despite this sounds clear with not a deep research and reading, it secretly allows a lot of problems to emerge without any will. On this occasion the nuclear states are studying nuclear energy with only mentioning that they are using this energy only for the purpose of contributing to society. Here there is also a dual-use problem due to the IAEA's limited oversight and insufficient rights over countries.

There are a lot of reasons for the nuclear states to resist disarmament.

1. Deterrence Doctrine: "Mutual Assured Destruction"

Nuclear powers argue that nuclear weapons are not intended for use—they are a deterrent. The logic: "If an enemy knows I can destroy them, they won't attack me." This doctrine shaped geopolitical stability during the Cold War and, they argue, continues to prevent major wars between great powers.

- **U.S. Perspective:** America maintains that its nuclear arsenal deters Russian aggression (especially relevant since Russia's invasion of Ukraine). Unilateral disarmament would remove this deterrent.
- **Russian Perspective:** Similarly, Russia views its nuclear arsenal as essential for deterring NATO expansion and protecting Russian security interests.
- **China's Perspective:** China's smaller arsenal (compared to U.S./Russia) is designed to ensure it maintains "credible deterrence" against potential adversaries.

2. The Trust Problem

Even if one country agrees to disarm, how can it verify that others are actually disarming? Nuclear weapons are small, hideable, and can be deployed secretly. Because nuclear weapons are really effective weapons of mass destruction no country would accept to disarm while their rival for being the greatest power of the world doesn't disarm. The main reasons that trust problems emerge and becloud the way to disarmament are verification difficulty, historical precedent.

- **Verification Difficulty:** You can't inspect every potential hiding place. An adversary could secretly keep weapons while claiming to have disarmed.
- **Historical Precedent:** During the Cold War, both superpowers hid weapons programs and deployed missiles without the other knowing immediately. This created deep mutual mistrust.

To be more precise and understandable a modern example may be given. Intelligence agencies still disagree about Israel's exact nuclear arsenal size, North Korea's current weapons count, and whether various countries have hidden weapons stockpiles.

In short, the nuclear state's logic is that they are in the same mind to disarm but with the circumstance that everybody will obey the rules and IAEA. Until the world has a reliable and perfect verification system and a trustworthy international enforcement mechanism, countries are going to keep some weapons as insurance.

3. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Another important topic addressed within the framework of the Treaty is the regulation of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The Treaty recognizes the right of all states to access and utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes such as energy production, medicine, agriculture, and scientific development. This principle is based on the understanding that nuclear technology can contribute significantly to economic development, technological advancement, and improvements in public health and living standards. However, this right is conditional and must be exercised in accordance with the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

The use of nuclear technology and nuclear energy is therefore required to remain strictly under the supervision and safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The purpose of this supervision is to ensure that nuclear materials, facilities, and technologies intended for civilian purposes are not diverted toward the development or production of nuclear weapons. Through inspection systems, monitoring mechanisms, and verification protocols, the IAEA plays a key role in maintaining transparency and trust between states while promoting the safe and secure use of nuclear energy worldwide.

In order to strengthen this framework, several measures were encouraged or imposed on states involved in the transfer or development of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. These measures include promoting international cooperation in the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful applications, requiring mandatory IAEA safeguards for nuclear facilities and nuclear fuel cycles, and encouraging transparency in the production, processing, and storage of nuclear materials. States are also expected to report their nuclear activities and allow international inspections when necessary in order to verify compliance with non-proliferation commitments.

Electricity generation is one of the most significant civilian applications of nuclear technology. Nuclear power plants produce large amounts of electricity through nuclear fission, providing a stable and low-carbon energy source that helps countries reduce dependence on fossil fuels and limit greenhouse gas emissions. In the medical field, nuclear technology plays a crucial role in radiotherapy for cancer treatment, where controlled radiation is used to destroy cancer cells while minimizing damage to surrounding healthy tissue. Additionally, nuclear techniques are widely used in agriculture and food safety. Radiation can sterilize harmful bacteria, parasites, and insects in food products, extending shelf life and improving food security. In agriculture, radiation is also used to develop more resilient crop varieties through mutation breeding. Lastly, nuclear technology supports scientific research in areas such as material science, environmental monitoring, and isotope tracing, which allows scientists to track chemical and biological processes in ecosystems, water systems, and living organisms.

The supervision mechanisms established under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) can be significantly strengthened in several ways in order to better prevent the development of nuclear weapons. One of the most important improvements would be the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol. This protocol grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) broader authority to access information and inspect facilities that may be connected to nuclear activities. Under the standard safeguards agreements, the IAEA mainly verifies declared nuclear materials and facilities, which means that undeclared activities may remain undetected. The Additional Protocol, however, allows inspectors to request more comprehensive information about nuclear-related research, manufacturing, and fuel cycle activities. If all NPT member states were required to adopt and implement this protocol, the transparency of national nuclear programs would increase significantly and the risk of covert nuclear weapons development would decrease.

Another important method of tightening supervision would be increasing the frequency and unpredictability of inspections. Although the IAEA already conducts regular inspections, these visits are often scheduled in advance. Introducing more short-notice or unannounced inspections would make it far more difficult for states to conceal prohibited activities or temporarily remove sensitive materials before inspectors arrive. This approach would strengthen deterrence because states would know that their nuclear facilities could be inspected at any time. In addition, expanding the range of locations subject to inspection—such as research institutions, enrichment-related industries, or supply chains—would help ensure that nuclear weapon programs cannot be hidden outside officially declared nuclear facilities.

The use of advanced monitoring technologies should also be expanded to enhance verification capabilities. Modern tools such as satellite imagery, environmental sampling, remote sensors, and advanced data analysis systems can provide continuous oversight of nuclear activities. Environmental sampling, for example, allows inspectors to detect microscopic traces of nuclear materials in air, soil, or water, which can reveal undeclared nuclear activities even if facilities attempt to conceal them. Similarly, satellite monitoring can detect suspicious construction or unusual activity around nuclear-related facilities. By integrating these technological methods with traditional inspections, the IAEA could monitor nuclear programs more effectively and identify potential violations much earlier.

Finally, stronger enforcement mechanisms and international cooperation are necessary to ensure that violations are addressed effectively. When the IAEA detects non-compliance, cases are typically referred to the United Nations Security Council, which decides on possible diplomatic or economic measures. However, the process can sometimes be slow or influenced by political disagreements. Establishing clearer and more automatic response mechanisms could make enforcement more consistent and credible. Furthermore, closer cooperation between the IAEA and national intelligence agencies could improve the detection of secret nuclear activities, as intelligence information can complement technical inspections. Strengthening these enforcement and cooperation frameworks would increase the overall effectiveness of the NPT system and reinforce global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Problem of Prohibition of Transfer and Acquisition(Article I)

Article I and Article II together form the core nonproliferation pillar of the NPT, establishing a clear division of responsibilities between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Article I prohibits NWS from transferring nuclear weapons or assisting any state in acquiring them, while Article II obligates NNWS not to receive, manufacture, or seek assistance in obtaining such weapons. On paper, this creates a comprehensive legal barrier against proliferation, ensuring that nuclear weapons remain limited to a small group of states. However, this structure is inherently unequal, as it formally recognizes five nuclear-weapon states while permanently restricting all others. This asymmetry has been one of the most controversial aspects of the treaty, as many NNWS argue that it institutionalizes a form of global nuclear hierarchy rather than eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.

One of the major problems with Articles I and II lies in their ambiguity regarding indirect assistance and technological cooperation. While Article I clearly forbids direct transfer or assistance, it does not fully define what constitutes “assistance” or “encouragement.” This creates space for controversial practices such as nuclear cooperation agreements, dual-use technology transfers, and security arrangements that may indirectly support nuclear capabilities. For example, nuclear knowledge, delivery systems, or advanced technologies can sometimes be shared under the label of civilian or defensive cooperation, even though they may contribute to a state’s latent nuclear weapons capability. This ambiguity makes enforcement difficult and allows states to operate within the legal boundaries of the treaty while still advancing strategic advantages.

Another critical loophole is the problem of “latent nuclear capability”, which is not explicitly addressed in Articles I and II. The treaty prohibits the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons, but it does not prevent states from developing the technological infrastructure necessary to build them quickly if they choose to do so. As highlighted in the Nuclear Threat Initiative materials, countries are allowed to pursue nuclear energy under safeguards, but the line between civilian and military capability is extremely thin. This means that a state can remain fully compliant with Article II while still positioning itself as a “threshold state” capable of rapidly producing nuclear weapons. This loophole weakens the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime because it focuses on intentions rather than capabilities.

Enforcement is another major weakness of Articles I and II. The NPT relies heavily on the verification system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors civilian nuclear activities to ensure they are not diverted for military purposes. However, safeguards are not always sufficient to detect clandestine programs or undeclared facilities. Historical cases such as North Korea and Iran demonstrate how states can exploit gaps in the system, either by secretly developing nuclear capabilities or by limiting cooperation with inspectors. Moreover, the NPT lacks strong enforcement mechanisms or automatic penalties for violations, meaning that responses depend largely on political decisions by the international community, particularly the United Nations Security Council. This politicization often leads to inconsistent enforcement and undermines the credibility of the treaty.

Finally, Articles I and II are deeply connected to broader structural criticisms of the NPT, particularly the perception of “nuclear inequality” and double standards. While NNWS are strictly prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons, NWS are allowed to retain their arsenals indefinitely, as long as they commit to eventual disarmament under Article VI. Many states argue that this creates a lack of trust and reduces incentives for compliance, as the benefits and obligations of the treaty are not equally distributed. Additionally, arrangements such as nuclear alliances and extended deterrence policies further blur the lines of compliance, raising questions about whether the spirit of Article I is truly being upheld. As a result, despite their central importance, Articles I and II continue to face significant challenges in both interpretation and implementation, highlighting the ongoing struggle to balance security, fairness, and nonproliferation in the international system.

The Problem of Peaceful Nuclear Rights (Article IV)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stands as the central legal and political foundation of the global non-proliferation regime, built upon a delicate balance between preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and allowing access to peaceful nuclear technology. This balance is most clearly reflected in the relationship between Article IV and Article VI, often described as the “grand bargain” of the treaty. While nuclear-weapon states commit to eventual disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon states are guaranteed the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, this dual commitment has created persistent tensions, as many states argue that the obligations are unevenly fulfilled. Non-nuclear states increasingly question whether nuclear powers are genuinely pursuing disarmament, while nuclear states remain concerned that civilian nuclear programs may be used as a pathway toward weaponization.

A central issue highlighted in the study is the dual-use nature of nuclear technology, particularly within the nuclear fuel cycle. Technologies such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are essential for producing nuclear energy, yet they can also be directly used to produce materials for nuclear weapons. This creates a fundamental dilemma: the same infrastructure that supports peaceful development can be rapidly redirected toward military purposes. The case of Iran illustrates this challenge, as undeclared enrichment activities raised concerns about whether civilian programs were masking potential weapons ambitions. The NPT framework, while designed to prevent proliferation, struggles to address this ambiguity effectively, especially when states operate within the legal boundaries of the treaty while simultaneously advancing sensitive capabilities.

The study further emphasizes how changes in the global security environment have intensified these challenges. During the Cold War, nuclear dynamics were largely shaped by bipolar competition, but today’s world is far more complex, with regional rivalries, emerging powers, and non-state actors playing significant roles. Countries may pursue nuclear capabilities not only for deterrence but also for regional influence or international prestige. Additionally, the spread of knowledge, technology, and illicit networks—such as those associated with Abdul Qadeer Khan—has made it easier for states to access critical nuclear components. This increased accessibility, combined with shifting motivations, has made the risk of proliferation more diffuse and difficult to control.

Another major concern is the interaction between Article IV and Article X of the NPT, which allows states to withdraw from the treaty under certain conditions. This creates a potential loophole whereby a country can legally develop nuclear infrastructure under the guise of peaceful use and later exit the treaty to pursue nuclear weapons. The example of North Korea demonstrates how this pathway can undermine the non-proliferation regime. A state could comply with safeguards while building technical capacity, only to later convert that capacity into a weapons program after withdrawal. This scenario raises serious questions about the long-term sustainability of the NPT and whether its legal framework is sufficient to address modern proliferation risks.

In response to these challenges, the study explores possible solutions, including strengthening safeguards, tightening export controls, and promoting multinational approaches to sensitive nuclear activities. One significant proposal involves placing enrichment and reprocessing facilities under international or multinational control, thereby limiting the spread of nationally controlled fuel cycle capabilities. Initiatives supported by organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency aim to create mechanisms such as nuclear fuel banks, which would guarantee access to fuel without requiring states to develop their own enrichment capabilities. These approaches seek to preserve the rights granted under Article IV while reducing the risks associated with proliferation, although their implementation remains politically and technically challenging.

Ultimately, the core issue lies in reconciling the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy with the necessity of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. The study highlights that this is not merely a legal question but a deeply political one, involving trust, security perceptions, and global power dynamics. Efforts to restrict access to sensitive technologies may be perceived as discriminatory or as creating a form of “nuclear apartheid,” a concern historically raised by states such as India. At the same time, unrestricted access risks undermining the very purpose of the NPT. As a result, the future of the treaty depends on finding a sustainable balance that ensures both non-proliferation and equitable access to peaceful nuclear technology, a challenge that remains unresolved and continues to shape international security debates.

The Problem of Disarmament (Article VI)

The NPT has a part called Article VI that people talk about a lot because it is not very clear. Article VI of the NPT says that all the countries that are part of the NPT have to try to stop the nuclear arms race and get rid of all weapons.. Article VI of the NPT does not say when they have to do it or how they have to do it. Because of this, countries have ideas about what Article VI of the NPT means. The United States and Russia, which have weapons, say that they are doing what Article VI of the NPT says because they are reducing their nuclear weapons and making agreements with other countries. They are also trying to make sure that everyone is safe. Other countries that do not have nuclear weapons do not think that the United States and Russia are doing enough. They think that the United States and Russia're not getting rid of their nuclear weapons fast enough and that they are still making new nuclear weapons. These countries think that the NPT means that countries have to try to get rid of all their nuclear weapons, not just a few. This is a problem because countries do not agree on what Article VI of the NPT means. This makes it hard for countries to trust each other. It makes people wonder if the NPT is working. As long as countries do not agree on what Article VI of the NPT means it will be hard to make progress on getting rid of weapons. Article VI of the NPT will keep being something that people talk about when they discuss weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a key international agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament. With 189 member states, it is the most widely adopted arms control treaty. Under Article VI, all parties commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and achieve global nuclear disarmament. The United States argues that it is fulfilling these obligations through major reductions in its nuclear arsenal, both independently and in cooperation with Russia and NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has significantly decreased its reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced its stockpile, and lowered the alert status of its forces. Strategic changes, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, introduced a broader security approach combining nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, defensive systems, and a flexible defense infrastructure.

The U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons by thousands since the late 1980s and continues to lower deployed warheads under agreements like the Moscow Treaty. It has also dismantled delivery systems, cut defense spending on nuclear forces, and reduced non-strategic nuclear weapons by nearly 90%. Additionally, the U.S. no longer produces fissile material for weapons and has repurposed large amounts for civilian use under international oversight. Although the U.S. maintains its nuclear capabilities, it states that it is not developing new nuclear weapons, only researching potential technologies. It also continues to observe a nuclear testing moratorium and supports international monitoring efforts. Beyond its own reductions, the United States has contributed billions of dollars to help former Soviet states secure and dismantle nuclear materials. Cooperation with Russia has led to further arms reductions, disposal of weapons-grade materials, and improved security of nuclear facilities. Overall, the U.S. maintains that nuclear weapons now play a smaller role in its security strategy and that it remains committed to the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament under the NPT.

The Problem of Withdrawal Clause (Article X)

Advantages of establishment of the Withdrawal Clause

The NPT agreement allows countries to withdraw from the agreement with Article X and this clause's aim is to protect the country's sovereignty in a possible future threat, especially militarily from the countries nearby. One of the main advantages of Article X is that it respects state sovereignty. Countries are not permanently locked into the treaty if their national security is threatened. This flexibility encourages member states to initially join the NPT agreement, since they know they retain the legal right to withdraw if necessary.

Although Article X creates an easy door to withdraw from the agreement it also created a legal and formal process to withdraw from the agreement. Article X provides a formal and legal process for leaving the treaty. Instead of secretly violating the agreement, states must notify the international community and provide justification, which helps maintain transparency in international relations.

NPT also allows an early opportunity for diplomatic intervention. The three-month notice period allows time for diplomacy by the international community and institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the United Nations to negotiate and potentially prevent escalation.

Disadvantages of establishment of the Withdrawal Clause

One of the aforementioned problems in the study guide is that the agreement isn't worldwide enough. Countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan didn't participate because of the current and past political situations of their region and not being recognized by most of the countries and North Korea which withdrew from the agreement.

One of the main problems that must be solved with this renewal is the problem and loophole caused by the Withdrawal Clause (Article X). This clause is a short way to withdraw from the agreement if a crisis or military escalation that may lead to a nuclear war between the nuclear-weapon states erupts. The only country that signed the agreement and then withdrew from this agreement is North Korea which withdrew in 2003. The opportunity given to the countries for defence and precautions against crisis times such as wars, militaric and politic escalations can be abused.

In the withdrawal clause the most necessary reason to demand a withdrawal from the agreement is extraordinary events and state of emergency. Although writing to NPT agreement that some circumstances are needed, this agreement is shortchanged from the definition of what are extraordinary events. The treaty does not clearly define what counts as "extraordinary events." Because of this ambiguity, states can justify withdrawal based on subjective security claims, making the clause difficult to enforce.

The withdrawal clause in Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) carries a significant risk of accelerating nuclear proliferation. If a state decides to withdraw from the treaty and begins pursuing nuclear weapons, it may create a strong sense of insecurity among neighboring states. These neighboring countries might perceive the withdrawing state as a potential threat and could therefore feel pressured to initiate their own nuclear weapons programs as a form of deterrence. This chain reaction can lead to a regional arms race, where multiple states compete to develop or acquire nuclear capabilities. Such proliferation would directly contradict the core objective of the NPT, which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and maintain international security. Moreover, the possibility of rapid proliferation increases global instability, as more actors possessing nuclear weapons raises the risk of miscalculation, escalation, or even nuclear conflict. Therefore, the withdrawal clause, while designed to protect national sovereignty, may unintentionally undermine the treaty's effectiveness by enabling conditions that encourage further nuclear armament.

The withdrawal of North Korea from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003 created a significant precedent that raised serious concerns about the treaty's credibility and long-term effectiveness. After leaving the NPT, North Korea continued its nuclear weapons program and later conducted multiple nuclear tests, demonstrating how a state could potentially exploit the withdrawal clause to avoid international restrictions. This event highlighted a major loophole in the treaty: a country can benefit from nuclear technology and expertise while being a member, and then withdraw and redirect that knowledge toward military nuclear development. As a result, the case of North Korea weakened confidence in the treaty's enforcement mechanisms and raised fears that other states might follow a similar path if they believe their security interests require nuclear deterrence. The precedent also complicated diplomatic efforts, as it showed that the international community has limited tools to prevent or reverse such withdrawals once they occur. Consequently, the North Korean example is often cited as evidence that stronger safeguards and clearer consequences are necessary to preserve the credibility and authority of the NPT.

Another critical weakness of Article X is the absence of clearly defined penalties or enforcement mechanisms for states that withdraw from the treaty. While the article requires a state to provide a three-month notice and explain the extraordinary events that have jeopardized its national interests, it does not specify any concrete consequences if that state later violates the principles of nuclear non-proliferation. This lack of explicit sanctions can weaken the treaty's deterrence effect, as countries may calculate that the political and economic costs of withdrawal are manageable compared to the perceived security benefits of developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, without predetermined penalties, the international response often depends on ad-hoc diplomatic negotiations, sanctions, or decisions by international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council. Such responses can vary depending on geopolitical circumstances and the interests of major powers, leading to inconsistencies in enforcement. This uncertainty reduces the overall strength of the treaty and may encourage some states to test the limits of the system. Strengthening the withdrawal

framework by establishing clearer consequences or automatic international review mechanisms could help reinforce the credibility of the NPT and discourage states from using withdrawal as a pathway toward nuclear weapon development.

Consensus Problem in Middle East WMD-Free Zone

The 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference decided to have a meeting in Finland in 2012. The goal was to move towards creating a zone in the Middle East that is free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This idea was based on a 1995 resolution and standing efforts by Arab states and Iran. Arab states, which make up most of the region stress that this zone must include all countries, Israel. They want it to be based on existing frameworks like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They also want to ensure the right to nuclear energy. The zone should have verification through bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency. Arab states support a nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction-free zone. They link progress across chemical and biological disarmament. They call for confidence-building measures, clear timelines and a structured negotiation process. Major powers should support this process. Even though there are challenges, like tensions and unequal treaty participation, the 2012 conference is seen as a key step. It is a step toward security, disarmament and strengthening the global nonproliferation regime.

The urgent need for a Middle East WMD-free zone has intensified amid rising regional conflicts, including tensions between Israel and Iran, the war in Gaza, and instability in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, making disarmament efforts more critical than ever. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognized by the United Nations, have proven effective globally, but in the Middle East progress remains limited despite initiatives since 1974 and renewed efforts through the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and later UN-led meetings. A key obstacle is that Israel, widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, has not joined the NPT, while concerns over Iran's nuclear program and setbacks such as the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action have deepened mistrust. Ongoing conflicts, foreign interventions, and security arrangements like nuclear deployments in Turkey further complicate negotiations. However, successful examples from Africa and Latin America show that cooperative, transparent, and verifiable agreements can enhance regional security. Despite major political challenges, establishing a WMD-free zone would significantly reduce proliferation risks, strengthen global disarmament efforts, and promote long-term peace and stability in one of the world's most volatile regions.

A Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME-WMDFZ) represents a long-standing vision for transforming one of the most volatile regions in global security into a zone of cooperation, transparency, and reduced military threat. Under this framework, no country in the region would possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and all states would be required to accept strict international inspections to verify compliance. Beyond disarmament, the initiative aims to foster trust among historically adversarial states by encouraging security cooperation and mutual accountability. In theory, such a zone would not only eliminate the most destructive categories of weapons but also serve as a foundation for broader regional stability.

The importance of such a zone becomes clearer when considering the current proliferation risks in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program continues to advance under intense international scrutiny, raising concerns about potential weaponization. Israel is widely believed to possess a significant nuclear arsenal, although it maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has expressed increasing interest in nuclear technology, potentially signaling the early stages of a regional arms competition. Syria's documented use of chemical weapons and its alleged pursuit of biological capabilities further highlight the dangers, while Iraq's past WMD programs serve as a reminder of how quickly such capabilities can develop. In this context, a WMD-free zone could significantly reduce tensions and prevent further escalation.

Despite being proposed as early as 1974, the implementation of such a zone has repeatedly failed, largely due to deep-rooted political and security dilemmas. One of the most significant obstacles is Israel's refusal to participate. Israel has never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and considers its nuclear deterrent essential for survival in a region where it faces persistent hostility. From Israel's perspective, disarmament without comprehensive peace agreements would create unacceptable vulnerabilities. At the same time, participation would require transparency and international inspections, potentially exposing sensitive security information and increasing diplomatic pressure. This creates a classic "Catch-22": Arab states insist that Israel must be included for the zone to be credible, while Israel refuses to engage without prior guarantees of regional peace.

Iran's position adds another layer of complexity. Although Iran has historically supported the idea of a WMD-free zone, its nuclear activities have generated widespread suspicion among both Western countries and regional rivals. Iran faces a strategic dilemma: abandoning its nuclear ambitions could weaken its deterrence against Israel, but continuing its program undermines trust and blocks any meaningful progress toward a regional agreement. Even if Iran were to formally commit to the zone, lingering doubts about compliance would remain, making verification and enforcement critical yet highly contentious issues.

Arab states, particularly those within the Arab League, have consistently supported the establishment of a WMD-free zone but under strict conditions. They emphasize the necessity of universal participation, arguing that any agreement excluding key actors—especially Israel—would be ineffective. Additionally, they demand robust verification systems, including intrusive inspections and the possibility of unannounced visits, to ensure full compliance. Clear timelines for disarmament and automatic enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions for violations, are also considered essential. Importantly, Arab states insist that the zone must cover not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons, aligning the initiative with broader international disarmament frameworks.

Geopolitical realities further complicate the issue. Turkey's role as a NATO member hosting U.S. nuclear weapons raises questions about whether a regional zone would require the removal of foreign nuclear assets, potentially straining alliance commitments. The ongoing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia fuels mutual distrust, with each side fearing that the other might secretly retain or develop prohibited capabilities. The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict also remains a major barrier, as many Arab states link disarmament progress to broader political solutions in the region. Additionally, the extensive military presence of the United States introduces further ambiguity regarding whether external powers would need to adjust their strategic posture for such a zone to function.

Efforts to implement the zone have so far been unsuccessful, with the 2012 conference in Finland representing a notable failure. Intended as a breakthrough moment, the conference collapsed due to irreconcilable differences. Arab states pushed for immediate and binding disarmament commitments, while nuclear powers favored a more gradual approach. Israel refused to participate altogether, and no consensus could be reached on enforcement mechanisms. Ultimately, each side perceived the proposed arrangements as disproportionately benefiting their adversaries, reinforcing existing mistrust rather than resolving it.

Comparisons with other regions highlight both the potential and the challenges of establishing such a zone. Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia have all successfully implemented nuclear weapon-free zones through treaties such as Tlatelolco, Pelindaba, and the Bangkok Treaty. These successes were made possible by regional consensus, the absence of active nuclear arsenals within the regions, and relatively strong institutional frameworks to support compliance. In contrast, the Middle East faces a far more complex landscape, characterized by active or suspected WMD programs, ongoing conflicts, and significant involvement from external powers such as the United States and Russia. The absence of a strong, unified regional organization further limits the ability to enforce agreements.

In conclusion, while a Middle East WMD-free zone remains a highly desirable goal with the potential to transform regional security, its realization is hindered by a combination of strategic distrust, unresolved conflicts, and geopolitical rivalries. The concept continues to be supported in principle by many states, but without significant progress in regional diplomacy and confidence-building, it is unlikely to move from vision to reality in the near future.

What We Expect From You?

Our committee mainly focuses on the lack of inequality in the definition of nuclear states, Peaceful usage of nuclear energy and weak Enforcements against proliferation. The representatives shall bring details which means detailed as being able to give answers basically to Wh- Questions. The representatives shall read the ensured study guide and then make researchers in every desired topic that the representatives have ideas upon.

The UNODA committee of the AUMUN'26 conference aims to renew the NPT agreement as the agenda item mentions. The representatives of each member states of the UNODA committee and officially is a signature for the NPT agreement shall write a position paper that shall introduce the country, country's main ideas and thoughts on the agenda item and some other details that the representatives shall look from the URL link below:

<https://www.munturkey.com/how-to-write-a-position-paper-by-neris-aydemir/>

<https://www.wisemee.com/how-to-write-a-mun-position-paper/>

The representatives ought to do some research about the agenda item and especially the main lack of the agreement and the ways to solve them. The research that is done by the representatives shall be about the precautions that are taken with the establishment of NPT agreement, the advantages and disadvantages created with this and possible detailed solutions.

In the end of the committee, after the debate part of the committee is finished with enough for the final document we are going to write a communique that we as the academic team recommend you to look at some communique examples that will be useful while we are writing our final document. Below you can find an example of communique that will be helpful to you:

<https://documents.munturkey.com/slovakia-nato-communique-ozan-ozdemir/>

Questions to be Considered

- 1- How can the efficiency and balance in the new definition of nuclear states be ensured?
- 2- How can the persistence of the countries on nuclear weapon usage be reduced by recognizing and tightening the precautions and penalization that have been taken with the establishment of the NPT agreement? (Article VI)
- 3- How can Article I & II which causes indirect nuclear technology transfer within the legal frameworks of NATO be improved? (Article I & II)
- 4- What are the main possible problems that may be caused by the withdrawal clause which may allow countries to nuclearly arm and create escalations in the region and how can this problem be solved? (Article X)
- 5- How can consensus and the permission of all Middle Eastern states be secured regarding the Middle East WMD-Free Zone?
- 6- How can dual-use technologies be deeply and widely supervised for understanding the reasons and the goals of nuclear energy-power experiments with the assistance of IAEA? (Article IV)

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